The role of social proximity in professional CEO appointments: Evidence from caste/religion‐based hiring of CEOs in India

Research Summary: The role of homophily in CEO appointments at the largest corporations is an important subject in corporate governance. This subject is particularly important in a country like India where a multitude of religions, castes, and communities form its social fabric. We test for the role of homophily in professional CEO appointments in India by empirically examining the preference for same caste/religion CEOs by the largest firms. Using a unique dataset, assembled by detailed identification of castes/religions from family names and counterfactuals obtained through the Coarsened Exact Matching technique, we find that caste/religion plays a crucial role in CEO selection as a source of information (positive discrimination). The evidence is not consistent with its use to pursue taste‐based preferences (negative discrimination). Managerial Summary: We test for the role of homophily in the appointments of CEOs in India by empirically examining the preference for same caste/religion CEOs by the largest firms. We find that caste/religion plays an important role in CEO selection, i.e., as a form of information or “positive discrimination.” The evidence is not consistent with its use to pursue taste‐based preferences or “negative discrimination.”     

CEO's financial experience and earnings management

We study whether Chinese CEOs with financial experience engage in more earnings management or less earnings management than those without such experience. In doing so, we distinguish between accrual-based earnings management and real earnings management. Overall, we find that CEOs with financial experience tend to do less real earnings management, while we find no evidence that they do either more or less accrual-based earnings management. Our findings tend to confirm that CEOs with financial experience provide more precise earnings information and higher quality financial statements.     

Compensation of owner managers in Canadian family‐owned businesses: expropriation of minority shareholders

The aim of this paper is to test the hypothesis of owner managers expropriating minority shareholders by receiving excessive compensation. Using a sample of Canadian family firms, we found that when there is divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights, owner CEOs receive higher compensation than non‐owners. The higher the divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights, the higher the excess compensation. Further analysis shows that only poorly governed firms are affected by the expropriation problem. Copyright © 2010 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

INDIFFERENCE PRICE WITH GENERAL SEMIMARTINGALES

Using duality methods, we prove several key properties of the indifference price π for contingent claims. The underlying market model is very general and the mathematical formulation is based on a duality naturally induced by the problem. In particular, the indifference price π turns out to be a convex risk measure on the Orlicz space induced by the utility function.     

The differential effects of CEO narcissism and hubris on corporate social responsibility

Research Summary: While prior studies have predominantly shown that CEO narcissism and hubris exhibit similar effects on various strategic decisions and outcomes, this study aims to explore the mechanisms underlying how narcissistic versus hubristic CEOs affect their firms differently. Specifically, we investigate how peer influence moderates the CEO narcissism/hubris—corporate social responsibility (CSR). With a sample of S&P 1500 firms for 2003–2010, we find that the positive relationship between CEO narcissism and CSR is strengthened (weakened) when board‐interlocked peer firms invest less (more) intensively in CSR than a CEO's own firm; the negative relationship between CEO hubris and CSR is strengthened when peer firms are engaged in less CSR than a CEO's own firm. Managerial Summary: Some CEOs are more narcissistic while others may be more hubristic, but these two groups of CEOs hold different attitudes toward the extent to which their firms should engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR). Our findings with a large sample of U.S. publically listed firms suggest that narcissistic CEOs care more about CSR, but hubristic CEOs care less. Interestingly, when narcissistic CEOs observe their peer firms engaging in more or less CSR than their own firms, they tend to respond in an opposite manner; in contrast, hubristic CEOs will only engage in even less CSR when their peers also do not emphasize CSR. Our findings point to a fundamental difference between CEO narcissism and hubris in terms of how they affect firms' CSR decisions based on their social comparison with peer firms.     

Executive succession: The importance of social capital in CEO appointments

Research Summary: Firm performance and corporate governance have been shown to influence CEO selection, but our understanding of the role of social capital is more limited. In this study, we seek to provide further insight into the role of social capital by examining the influence of both “bonding” and “bridging” forms of social capital on CEO appointments. We find that candidates who have relational social capital, in terms of overlap with the CEO in organizational tenure, board tenure, and CEO tenure are more likely to be appointed as CEO. We also find that candidates who have external linkages to the CEO in the form of geographic, prestigious university, and prior employment affiliations are more likely to be appointed CEO. Managerial Summary: The appointment of a new CEO has significant and widespread implications for the firm’s future strategic direction and performance, the relationship between the board and CEO, and perceptions by investors, employees, and other key stakeholders. Our study finds that candidates who have shared connections and experiences with the CEO in terms of geographic, prestigious university, or prior employment affiliations as well as overlap in terms of organizational tenure, board tenure, and CEO tenure are more likely to be appointed CEO. Given the enormous impact that executive appointments have on the strategic direction and performance of the company, it is important to recognize that social factors such as shared experiences and connections influence how candidates are perceived, and thus, may affect appointment decisions.     

MARKOWITZ'S PORTFOLIO OPTIMIZATION IN AN INCOMPLETE MARKET

In this paper, for a process S , we establish a duality relation between K_p , the     - closure of the space of claims in     , which are attainable by "simple" strategies, and     , all signed martingale measures     with     , where   p ≥ 1, q ≥ 1  and     . If there exists a     with     a.s., then K_p consists precisely of the random variables     such that ϑ is predictable S -integrable and     for all     . The duality relation corresponding to the case   p = q = 2  is used to investigate the Markowitz's problem of mean–variance portfolio optimization in an incomplete market of semimartingale model via martingale/convex duality method. The duality relationship between the mean–variance efficient portfolios and the variance-optimal signed martingale measure (VSMM) is established. It turns out that the so-called market price of risk is just the standard deviation of the VSMM. An illustrative example of application to a geometric Lévy processes model is also given.     

Optimal risk sharing with non-monotone monetary functionals

We consider the problem of sharing pooled risks among n economic agents endowed with non-necessarily monotone monetary functionals. In this framework, results of characterization and existence of optimal solutions are easily obtained as extensions from the convex risk measures setting. Moreover, the introduction of the best monotone approximation of non-monotone functionals allows us to compare the original problem with the one which involves only ad hoc monotone criteria. The explicit calculation of optimal risk sharing rules is provided for particular cases, when agents are endowed with well-known preference relations.      

CEO还是TMT——民营上市公司高管薪酬差距对于企业研发的影响

本文以手工收集的2012年中国民营上市公司高管薪酬数据为例,以行为理论、锦标赛理论以及堑壕理论为基础,以高管团队规模和控股股东为调节变量,实证分析了公司高管团队（TMT）薪酬差距对于企业研发的影响。本文研究发现,薪酬差距能够提升高管团队对于风险的接受水平,民营上市公司高管薪酬差距与公司的研发支出显著正相关,。此外,本文进一步的研究发现,高管薪酬差距对于企业研发的正向影响会受到高管团队规模以及控股股东持股比例的抑制,表明了锦标赛激励实施的局限性。本文的研究为理解民营企业高管薪酬差距与企业研发的关系提供了新的经验证据。